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ABSTRACT 
Although it is widely accepted that a theory of justice ought to be action-guiding, we lack a 
persuasive account of what this role entails. This omission has allowed a number of 
misleading narratives to emerge, including the realist claim that justice is of little relevance to 
citizens in practice because it is not action-guiding in circumstances of non-compliance. This 
paper seeks to correct this omission in the literature by providing a general account of the 
action-guiding role of justice. In so doing it makes three contributions to the literature on 
justice. Firstly, it explains what kind of guidance we should expect a theory of justice to offer 
citizens. Secondly, it specifies the criteria that a particular theory of justice needs to satisfy to 
qualify as action-guiding. And thirdly, it demonstrates that, contrary to realist criticisms, 
justice is action-guiding in circumstances of non-compliance and so is of practical use to 
citizens.  
 
Keywords: Justice, Realism, Politics, Action-guidance, Non-compliance, Non-ideal theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Political theorists have usually assumed that theories of justice are of practical use and 
interest to citizens and political leaders because they are action-guiding. Yet despite this 
common assumption (or perhaps because of it) few have sought to explain how a theory of 
justice can guide the actions of citizens and political leaders. 
 Given this notable omission it is not surprising that many political actors operate 
under the assumption that justice is largely irrelevant to political practice. After all it is not 
obvious that the kind of abstract moral theorizing that comprises many theories of justice has 
much to offer those who are required to make decisions within the complex and difficult 
confines of political practice. What is perhaps more surprising, however, is that this view of 
justice has recently gained currency among political theorists.  
Drawing on the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Nietzsche, a number of political 
theorists have questioned the belief that justice is action-guiding.1 Their argument, targeted 
primarily at Rawls’s theory of justice, but more widely applicable to ideal theory in general, 
is that justice is not capable of guiding the actions of political actors because it is unsuited to 
the practical circumstances of real politics. Underlying this claim is the belief that theories of 
justice of the kind typified by Rawls are designed for an idealized society in which all 
citizens comply fully with the demands of justice. Realists argue that this assumption of full-
compliance renders a theory of justice incapable of guiding action because real world politics 
is characterized by non-compliance and this affects what citizens and political leaders ought 
to do. A theory of justice cannot provide useful guidance because its failure to take account 
                                                          
1 See for example: Farrelly (2007); Galston (2010); Geuss (2008); Horton (2010); Mills 
(2005); Phillips (1985); Rossi & Sleat (2014); Schmidtz (2011); Sen (2006); Sen (2009);  
Wiens (2012); Wiens (2015). 
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of non-compliance means that any recommendations it offers are at best useless and at worst 
dangerously misleading.  
In this paper I aim to show that the realist criticism of the action-guiding role of 
justice is mistaken. I do not engage directly with the realist critics of Rawls and ideal theory,2  
but rather seek to establish that their criticisms are mistaken by demonstrating that justice is 
action-guiding for citizens even in the circumstances of non-compliance that typically 
characterise real world politics. In so doing I hope not only to demonstrate that realist 
concerns are misplaced, but also to provide the account of action-guidance that is currently 
missing from the literature on justice.   
The argument of this paper proceeds as follows. I begin by explaining how a theory of 
justice guides action by showing that principles of justice function as decision-making 
procedures that citizens can use to help them decide what to do in matters relating to the 
design of their social and political institutions (section II). Secondly, I set out the criteria that 
a particular theory of justice must satisfy to qualify as action-guiding. I argue that a theory 
counts as action-guiding when its principles are capable of delivering coherent, consistent 
and determinate verdicts on the justness or unjustness of actions and citizens have the ability 
to use those principles to derive a prescription for action that they are able to comply with 
(sections III-V). Thirdly, I demonstrate that principles of justice are normally action-guiding 
in circumstances of non-compliance because the refusal of some citizens to do as they ought 
does not usually prevent others from using a principle as a decision-making procedure 
(sections VI-IX). I do, however, note one partial set of exceptions to that claim (duty-
cancelling cases), but point out that in such cases a principle of justice remains action-guiding 
                                                          
2 Those who have provided convincing defences of ideal theory against realist criticisms 
include: Erman and  Möller  (2013); Estlund (2011); Stemploska (2008); Swift (2008);  
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for at least some agents and that such cases are not the norm in moderately just and nearly 
just societies (section X). I then, fourthly, outline two implications that my account of the 
action-guiding role of justice has for how we should think about politics (section XI). Here I 
draw attention to the central role that justice should play in political decision-making and the 
incompatibility of my account with realist and procedural theories of politics. I conclude by 
pointing out that the failure to acknowledge that justice is action-guiding in circumstances of 
non-compliance not only constitutes a basic misunderstanding of how justice applies to 
citizens in unjust circumstances, but gives licence to those who are unwilling to comply with 
justice by suggesting that non-compliance is either unavoidable or justifiable.  
 
II. PRINCIPLES AS DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES 
Rawls’s theory of justice is an obvious starting point for any discussion about the action-
guiding role of justice. In part this is because his theory of justice has been the main target of 
realist criticisms, but also because his views on justice, more than most, are characterized by 
a commitment to feasibility and practicality.3  
Reflecting that commitment, Rawls briefly discusses two ways in which a theory of 
justice can be thought of as action-guiding.4 He suggests that, first, a theory of justice is 
action-guiding insofar as it identifies and describes the objective that citizens should aim to 
                                                          
3 For an excellent discussion of Rawls’s realism see Gledhill (2012) 
4 See Rawls (1999a, 215-216); Rawls (1999b, 89-90). Those who discuss and broadly accept 
Rawls’s account of action-guidance include: Gilabert (2012); Jubb (2012); Robeyns (2008); 
Robeyns (2012); Simmons (2010); Stemplowska (2008); Stemplowska and Swift (2012); 
Swift (2008). 
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achieve (the just, or well-ordered, society). This provides guidance for citizens because when 
they make decisions about the design of their institutions they should do so with the long-
term aim of realising this objective in mind. Secondly, Rawls suggests that a theory is action-
guiding because it helps citizens understand which injustices they should seek to eliminate 
first. A theory of justice is necessary for this purpose because it is only possible to identify 
the most urgent injustices by measuring their distance from an ideal, or perfect, conception of 
justice. 
 Rawls’s account of the action-guiding role of justice is unsatisfactory for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, he says nothing about the properties a theory must possess to qualify as 
action-guiding. This is a significant omission because if we do not know which criteria a 
theory must satisfy to count as action-guiding then we cannot accurately assess the action-
guiding claims of candidate theories of justice. The second, and more serious, problem is that 
it fails to capture the immediate and direct ways in which a theory of justice is (or should be) 
action-guiding. For Rawls, justice is only indirectly action-guiding. It identifies the target we 
should ultimately seek to achieve and performs an instrumental role in identifying the most 
grievous injustices. But justice does not, on Rawls’s account, provide immediate and direct 
guidance for citizens who want to know what they ought to do here and now.  
These failings, along with the brevity of Rawls’s account, help explain why realists 
have reached the conclusion that justice is not action-guiding. And if Rawls’s account was 
the best that could be said about the action-guiding role of justice then it would be hard to 
disagree.  However, whilst realists are right to conclude that Rawls’s account of action-
guidance is unpersuasive they are wrong to draw the conclusion that justice is not action-
guiding in a direct and practically useful way. To see this it helps to understand why Rawls 
reached the conclusion that justice is only indirectly action-guiding. 
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The underlying problem with Rawls’s discussion of action-guidance is that it 
proceeds on the assumption that the aim of a theory of justice is to describe the ideal or 
perfectly just society.5 Although I don’t think this is Rawls’s considered view,6 it does inform 
his account of action-guidance and more recent discussions of the action-guiding role of 
justice. This is a problem not just because it is an unconvincing interpretation of the aim of a 
theory of justice, but because it is obscures the role performed by principles. This has 
contributed considerably to the confusion surrounding whether or how a theory is action-
guiding because, as I explain below, principles are the means by which a theory can guide the 
actions of citizens.  
The first step to overcoming this confusion is to recognise that the aim of a theory of 
justice is not to describe the perfectly just society, but to explain what makes social and 
political institutions just or unjust.7 A theory achieves this aim by formulating principles that 
systematically set out the conditions under which social and political institutions are just or 
unjust. When a principle, or set of principles, does this correctly it identifies the underlying 
features of institutions that make them just or unjust and, in so doing, contributes to our 
theoretical understanding of justice. It is possible to deduce from these principles what an 
                                                          
5 This view of justice is also widely accepted by realist critics of Rawls and forms the basis of 
their claim that justice is not action-guiding. See, for example, Sen (2006) and Sen (2009, 
Introduction and 98-102). 
6 For Rawls’s considered view of the aim of a theory of justice see Rawls (1999a, 40-46).  
7 On the explanatory aim of a theory of justice also see Rawls (1999, 41). 
8 
 
ideal or perfectly just society might look like, but this is incidental to what a theory of justice 
seeks to do and should not be confused with the primary, explanatory aim of a theory.8 
The fact that a theory of justice uses principles to achieve its explanatory aim is what 
also enables it to perform two further, practical roles. Firstly, when a principle correctly 
specifies the conditions under which an institution is just or unjust it also serves as a 
normative criterion of justice, or normative standard, which can be used by citizens to 
evaluate their particular social and political institutions.9 This is the evaluative role of a 
theory of justice. Secondly, a principle of justice that delivers verdicts on the justness or 
unjustness of particular institutions can be used by citizens to help them decide what to do in 
matters relating to the design of those institutions because those verdicts identify which of the 
actions available to citizens are permissible and impermissible. This, I am going to argue, 
forms the basis of the action-guiding role of a theory of justice.  
To better understand the action-guiding role of a principle of justice and how it relates 
to the other roles performed by a principle we can begin by considering an example. If Amy 
is trying to decide how to vote in a referendum that asks whether political parties and political 
campaigning should be funded publicly or by (unlimited) private contributions she might 
decide to consult Rawls’s theory of justice in the hope of finding guidance (and, for the sake 
argument, assume that Rawls’s first principle is correct). If Amy does this she will find that 
Rawls’s first principle explains that political institutions are just only when they provide 
                                                          
8 In this sense a theory of justice is like a moral theory. Thus, a complete moral theory could 
be used to explain what a perfectly moral society would look like but its primary aim is to 
explain what makes an action right or wrong. For a clear overview of the purpose of a moral 
theory see Timmons (2002, esp. chapter 1).  
9 On this role see Rawls (1996, 9).  
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citizens with a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, with fully adequate being 
understood to include fair value of the political liberties.10 If we again assume for the sake 
argument (and with Rawls11) that this principle delivers verdicts that say, all things being 
equal, public funding for political parties and political campaigning is consistent with the first 
principle and permitting (unlimited) private contributions is not, then Amy can use those 
verdicts to guide her reasoning and subsequent actions (given that she is motivated to act 
justly).  
We can see from this example how a principle of justice achieves its explanatory aim 
and performs its practical roles. It achieves its explanatory aim by identifying the underlying 
features that make an institution just or unjust. Hence, Rawls’s first principle identifies the 
equal distribution of basic liberties, including fair value of the political liberties, as an 
underlying property of just institutions and expresses that information as a general statement 
that says that political institutions ought to provide each citizen with a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic liberties. In achieving its explanatory aim a principle of justice also performs 
the first of its practical roles because it can function as a moral standard that can be used to 
evaluate political institutions. Thus, Rawls’s first principle would (all things being equal) 
evaluate a set of political institutions as just when they provide each citizen with a fully 
adequate scheme of equal basic liberties (including fair value for the political liberties) and 
unjust (or less than fully just) when they do not.  
                                                          
10 See Rawls (1999a, 197-199). 
11 It is Rawls’s view that the liberty principle would deliver these verdicts because unlimited 
private contributions are not consistent with the fair value of the political liberties. Rawls 
(1996, 356-363).  
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In its action-guiding role a principle of justice guides the reasoning of agents by 
delivering verdicts on the justness or unjustness of actions that agents can use to identify 
which of the actions available to them they ought to perform.  Rawls’s first principle does 
this by prescribing or permitting those actions that are consistent with furthering or 
supporting political institutions that distribute basic liberties equally and prohibiting those 
actions that undermine the ability of political institutions to distribute basic liberties equally. 
In the example above it was supposed that voting for the public funding of parties is 
permitted because it is consistent with the equal distribution of the basic liberties and voting 
for private contributions to parties is prohibited because it is inconsistent with an equal 
distribution of basic liberties.  
 Understanding this helps us explain how a theory of justice guides action. A theory 
guides action by formulating principles that agents can use as decision-making procedures to 
guide their reasoning about what it is they ought to do in a given situation. To perform this 
action-guiding role a principle of justice must also satisfy its explanatory aim because unless 
a principle correctly specifies what makes political institutions just or unjust it will fail to 
guide an agent’s reasoning in a way that is consistent with what justice requires. This means 
that a theory of justice is action-guiding only when its principles correctly explain what 
makes institutions just or unjust and can be used by agents as decision-making procedures.  
 Although a principle of justice must perform both of these roles if it is to provide the 
right kind of guidance, it is not self-evident that a principle that achieves its explanatory aim 
will necessarily be action-guiding. After all, we can readily conceive of a principle that is 
action-guiding but which fails to correctly specify what makes an institution just or unjust 
and so it is entirely possible that a principle that satisfies the explanatory aim of a principle of 
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justice may fail to be action-guiding.12 Consequently, if we want to know whether or not a 
particular theory is action-guiding we need to set out the criteria that any principle would 
have to satisfy in order to count as action-guiding rather than assuming that the action-
guiding role of justice is entailed by its explanatory aim.   
 
III. THE PROPERTIES OF AN ACTION-GUIDING PRINCIPLE 
If we assume that a given principle of justice correctly sets out the conditions under which a 
political institution is just or unjust (and is capable of performing its evaluative role) then it 
would need to satisfy at least four further conditions to also function as a decision-making 
procedure and so count as action-guiding.  
Firstly, to function as a decision-making procedure a principle of justice needs to 
deliver verdicts that recommend a coherent course of action. If a principle is defective in 
some way this may prevent it from delivering verdicts that agents can use to guide their 
actions. This criticism has been made of act utilitarian principles on the grounds that they 
require agents to compare and rank the consequences of actions that have yet to be 
performed. Doing this, it is argued, is incoherent and as a result utilitarian principles are 
unable to deliver meaningful verdicts.13 Secondly, a principle that is action guiding has to 
provide an agent with consistent guidance. Obviously, a principle that generates inconsistent 
verdicts in like cases would be incapable of providing agents with reliable guidance and so 
                                                          
12 On the relationship between the theoretical and practical role of a principle see McKeever 
and Ridge (2006, 9-10) and Vayrynen (2006, 292).  
13 See, for example, Singer’s discussion of the incoherence of comparing the consequences of 
actions that are yet to be performed in Singer (1977, 66-77). See also Smith (2012, 371). 
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does not count as action-guiding.14 But a more common problem is that a particular principle 
of justice may be only one constituent part of a theory of justice that comprises several 
principles. When that is the case it is important that principles do not offer conflicting 
verdicts and consequently inconsistent guidance. It is for this reason that Rawls emphasised 
the importance of priority rules and why he rejected intuitionism as ‘but half a conception of 
justice’.15 Thirdly, a principle must deliver determinate verdicts. A principle does this when 
the verdicts it delivers are clear and definite about the justness or unjustness of the action in 
question. A principle that fails to deliver definite verdicts on an action is of little use to an 
agent because it fails to pronounce unambiguously on the actions available to that agent and 
so provides no useful guidance. For example, a principle that says that political institutions 
should be structured in such a way that all persons are treated with equal respect offers little 
or no guidance to agents concerned with the design of political institutions because, unless 
more is said about what is involved in treating a person with respect, almost any or no action 
can be presented as consistent with treating persons with equal respect.16 A principle of 
justice (in conjunction with the relevant empirical facts) must therefore be capable of 
delivering determinate verdicts about the justness or unjustness of actions. Finally, a principle 
must provide verdicts across a range of cases. A principle that is narrowly drawn will avoid 
the problem of indeterminacy but only at the cost of delivering verdicts on a very small 
number of actions. Such a principle is liable to have nothing to say about most if not all of the 
                                                          
14 See Timmons (2002, 5-6). 
15 Rawls (1999a, 37).  
16 It is for this reason that Rawls rejected the idea of a principle of respect as a foundation for 
his theory of justice. Rawls (1999a, 513). On the indeterminacy of the concept of equal 
respect also see Griffin (1986, 208) and Timmons & Smit (2013, 229-268). 
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actions available to an agent and so will fail to provide the kind of guidance that agents 
expect.17   
 If we bring this together we can see that a principle of justice has the properties 
needed to function as a decision-making procedure when it is capable of delivering a 
determinate set of coherent and consistent verdicts about the justness or justness of actions 
across a range of cases. When this is the case we can say that a theory of justice is formally 
action-guiding because its principles possess the properties needed to function as decision-
making procedures.  
 
IV. USING A PRINCIPLE AS A GUIDE 
If a principle of justice possesses the properties required to function as a decision-making 
procedure then it is formally action-guiding because there is no defect within the principle 
that renders it incapable of guiding action. However, such a principle might not be action-
guiding for a particular agent because that agent may lack the ability to apply that principle to 
her circumstances and so will be incapable of using it to guide her actions.  
To apply a principle of justice to her particular circumstances an agent must have the 
ability to identify the verdicts that a principle delivers on the justness or unjustness of each of 
the actions that are available to her.18 If an agent does this correctly she should be able to use 
those verdicts to identify which of the actions available to her are prescribed (or permitted) 
                                                          
17 On the problems associated with understanding principles as ‘algorithmic decision-
procedures’ see McKeever and Ridge (2006, 11). 
18 This act of judgment is what Kant called the ‘middle term’ that connects theory and 
practice. See Kant (1970, 61-2). 
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and which are prohibited and, on the basis of that information, obtain a prescription that tells 
her what to do. If an agent can do this then she is capable of using a principle as a decision-
making procedure and it is action-guiding for her. However, there are at least four conditions 
that have to be met if an agent is to be capable of using a principle in this way. 
Firstly, to use a principle as a guide an agent must know that a principle applies to 
her. An agent that is ignorant of a principle or fails to appreciate that a principle applies to her 
in some given situation will not be able to use that principle to guide her actions.19 So if Amy 
is unaware that a principle of collective political responsibility20 to further justice applies to 
her then she will not be able to use that principle of justice to guide her actions. Secondly, if 
an agent does have knowledge of a principle and recognises that it applies to her then she will 
still be incapable of using that principle to guide her actions if she fails to understand what it 
requires of her. For example, if Amy knows that a principle of collective responsibility 
applies to her but does not understand what the concept of collective responsibility entails 
then she will not be able to use that principle to guide her action.21 Thirdly, an agent may 
know that a principle applies to her and have a sound understanding of that principle, but still 
be incapable of using it as a guide because she lacks the correct empirical beliefs needed to 
                                                          
19 This point provides support for Rawls’s claim that publicity is a formal constraint on a 
conception of justice. Rawls (1999, 48). 
20 I am thinking here of the kind of principle that would generate duties for citizens to 
(collectively and individually) promote and further just institutions, similar to what Rawls 
refers to as a principle of natural duty and Buchanan calls the robust natural duty of justice.  
See Rawls (1999a, 293-301) and  Buchannan (2002, 703-70) 
21 On concepts and principles that are not understood by agents and the effect this has on 
agent’s ability to use a principle as a guide see Smith (1989, 113-114). 
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apply the principle.  Hence, if Amy knows that a principle of collective responsibility 
requires her to support and vote for the party that will best promote justice but knows little to 
nothing of any party’s policies then she lacks the facts needed to apply and use the principle 
to guide her actions.22 Fourthly, an agent may understand a principle and possess what she 
believes to be the correct set of beliefs about her situation, but will fail to derive the correct 
prescription from that principle if it turns out that the beliefs she holds about her situation are 
mistaken. For example, if the principle of collective responsibility requires Amy to support 
and vote for the party that best protects the equal rights of all citizens then Amy needs to 
identify which of the available political parties’ policies would best do this. But if Amy 
misunderstands a party’s policies or mistakenly thinks that a particular party’s polices would 
best protect citizens rights when in fact they would not, then although she derives a 
prescription (vote for that particular party), she derive the wrong prescription on account of 
holding false beliefs.23 In this scenario Amy uses a principle to guide her actions but because 
she holds false beliefs, she uses it wrongly and derives a prescription that is contrary to what 
is actually prescribed by the principle in that context.  
                                                          
22 This is sometimes said to be a problem for act utilitarian principles because in many 
instances an agent will not possess the facts that would tell her which course of action would 
maximise general happiness. It for this reason that some utilitarians have sought to define 
outcomes not in terms of what is objectively maximally good, but in terms of what can 
reasonably be anticipated by an agent.  For a discussion of two attempts to do this see 
Vallentyne (1987). 
23 For a persuasive account of how the beliefs an agent holds affects their ability to use a 
principle as a guide see Smith (2012). 
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If these obstacles are avoided then an agent should have the ability to derive a correct 
prescription from a principle. But whilst being able to derive a correct prescription from a 
principle is necessary for an agent to use a principle as a guide, it is not sufficient because an 
agent must also have the ability to comply with that prescription. For example, if Amy 
consults a principle of justice and correctly derives a prescription that tells her to vote for a 
particular party (because its policies will best further justice) then the principle is only action-
guiding for her if she is able to vote for that party. If there is no election taking place or Amy 
is incapacitated so cannot get to the polling station then she lacks the ability to comply with 
the principle and so it is not action-guiding for her.24  
This means that, in addition to being able to derive a correct prescription from a 
principle, the action that a principle prescribes must also be available to an agent. If the 
relevant action is unavailable to an agent then the principle does not apply to the agent 
(because ‘ought implies can’) and so is not action-guiding.  There are typically two reasons 
why this might be so. Firstly, an agent may not have the opportunity to use a principle 
because the circumstances in which the principle would apply to the agent have not arisen 
and, secondly, an agent may lack the ability to comply with a principle because they are 
incapable of performing the action that a principle prescribes. In either of these instances an 
agent is incapable of complying with a principle and so cannot use it to guide her actions.25 
 
 
 
                                                          
24 This is, of course, another way of saying that ‘ought implies can’.  
25 On what counts as having – or not having – the ability to do something see Estlund (2011). 
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V. THE USABILTY DEMAND 
If an agent cannot use a principle to guide her actions then the principle does not apply. As it 
is a desideratum of any principle of justice that it should apply to the agent that it is intended 
for, then it follows that we should require a principle of justice to be usable as a guide by the 
constituency of agents to which it is supposed to apply. We can call this requirement the 
usability demand. 26 
 As we would normally expect a theory of justice to apply to all citizens27 it follows 
that each citizen must be capable of using that theory’s principles to guide their actions if the 
usability demand is to be satisfied. This poses a challenge because individual citizens have 
different sets of beliefs and varying cognitive, deliberative and other abilities. This means 
that in any given situation a principle that can be used as a guide by one citizen might not be 
one that can be used by another citizen.  
The appropriate response to this challenge is to say that if using a principle requires a 
level of competence that is beyond the capacity of some citizens then that principle ought to 
be rejected on the grounds that it does not apply to its intended constituency, viz. all citizens. 
As any plausible candidate theory of justice should satisfy the usability demand for all 
citizens, the level of competence required to use its principles must be consistent with the 
                                                          
26 The usability demand has wider scope than the ‘applicability demand’ discussed by Holly 
M. Smith because it is concerned with principles that agents can be expected to use rather 
than those that they can in fact use. See Smith (2012, 369-70). See also Timmons (2012, 
370). 
27 Here I assume that a conception of justice should apply to all citizens because each citizen 
is assumed to have a sufficiently developed sense of justice and hence the capacity to 
understand and comply with principles of justice. See Rawls (1999a, 496-505). 
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beliefs and abilities of all citizens.  Amongst other things, as we saw above, this requires a 
principle of justice to be public, comprehensible to all citizens, consistent with the (correct) 
beliefs that citizens hold, and compatible with the performative abilities of all citizens.   
However, when we evaluate whether or not an individual citizen has the ability to use 
a principle as a guide we need to take into account her capacity to acquire the beliefs and 
develop the abilities needed to use that principle.28 If we do not do this and instead consider 
an agent to be capable of using a principle only when she possesses the beliefs and abilities 
needed to immediately use that principle then we risk making the content of justice 
concessive to the beliefs and abilities that an agent has and not the beliefs and abilities we 
should expect her to have. For example, if a principle of collective responsibility requires 
Amy to vote for the party that will best further just institutions then she will, amongst other 
things, need to inform herself about the policies that each political party advocates. However, 
if Amy makes no effort to inform herself about these policies then she will be unable to 
derive the necessary prescription because she will lack the non-moral beliefs needed to use 
that principle as a decision-making procedure. Even though this means that Amy cannot use 
the principle to guide her actions, she ought to have been able to use it and so we should 
consider the principle action-guiding and Amy blameworthy for not having acquired the 
beliefs necessary to derive a prescription from a principle.   
Whilst we should be careful not to be concessive to the actual abilities and beliefs 
agents possess, it does not follow that a principle should be considered action-guiding just 
because an agent could acquire the beliefs or abilities needed to use that principle as a guide. 
In many cases an agent might have the ability to acquire the beliefs or abilities needed to use 
                                                          
28 On synchronic and diachronic possibilities with respect to agent abilities see Lawford-
Smith (2013, 249). 
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a principle but will not have a duty to do so because requiring this of an agent would be 
unreasonable. For example, if Amy has the ability to acquire the beliefs and skills needed to 
succeed in politics, then a principle that requires Amy to further justice might appear to 
require her to stand for political office and dedicate her life to furthering justice. However, 
even though Amy has the ability to acquire these beliefs and skills, we would ordinarily think 
that (extenuating circumstances aside) Amy is entitled to pursue her own projects and this 
includes choosing her own career.29 Consequently, we should understand an agent to be 
capable of using a principle not when she has or can acquire the beliefs and abilities to use it, 
but when she has or can reasonably be expected to acquire the beliefs or abilities needed to 
use that principle. 
If we bring together the arguments of the last three sections we can summarise the 
criteria that must be satisfied for a principle to count as action-guiding as follows: a principle 
is action-guiding when citizens can use it as a decision-making procedure to help them decide 
what to do. For this to be the case two general conditions have to be satisfied. Firstly, the 
principle must be capable of functioning as a decision-making procedure, which it is when it 
is capable of delivering coherent, consistent and determinate verdicts on the justness or 
unjustness of actions across a range of cases. Secondly, citizens must be capable of using the 
principle as a decision-making procedure, which they are when they possess, or can 
reasonably be expected to acquire, the beliefs and abilities needed to derive a prescription 
from that principle and act in conformity with that prescription. When both of these 
conditions are satisfied citizens are capable of using a principle of justice as a decision-
making procedure and so it should be considered action-guiding.  
                                                          
29 This is consistent with the fact that in certain circumstances an agent might be required to 
sacrifice their projects for the good of others. On this point see Goodin (2009). 
20 
 
 
VI. ACTION-GUIDANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE 
We have said that a principle is action-guiding when an agent is capable of using it as a 
decision-making procedure. However, as I noted earlier, there are a number of realist political 
theorists who deny that justice is action-guiding for citizens in circumstances of non-
compliance.30 In the remainder of this paper I am going to demonstrate that this is mistaken 
by showing how citizens can use a principle to guide their decision-making when others 
refuse to act justly.  
To do this I am going to focus on how non-compliance affects an agent’s ability or 
duty to comply with a principle.  The reason for this is that it is implausible to think that non-
compliance could somehow change the internal properties of a principle and render it 
incapable of delivering coherent, consistent and determinate verdicts. And similarly, it is hard 
to see how the refusal of some to comply with a principle would affect an agent’s ability to 
derive a prescription from a principle.31 Consequently, if non-compliance does undermine the 
action-guiding capacities of a principle it must be because it affects an agent’s ability or duty 
to comply with a principle of justice. I will argue, however, that non-compliance does not 
usually prevent an agent from being able to use a principle as a decision-making procedure 
and so does not normally render a principle incapable of guiding action. I will identify one 
                                                          
30 See fn1 above. 
31 The ability of agents to derive a prescription from a principle is more likely to be affected 
by collective action problems, as, for example, when uncertainty about the willingness of 
others to comply means that agents are not able to determine the facts of the situation and so 
cannot apply a principle reliably.  
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exception to this claim, but will note that even in this case some agents remain able to use a 
principle as a guide and so it remains partially action-guiding.  
 
VII. SIMPLE CASES  
It is usually thought that conative failures in an agent do not affect the capacity of a moral 
principle to guide action because an (inexcusable) unwillingness to do as a moral principle 
prescribes is a failure on the part of an agent, not the principle. So if Amy makes a promise to 
Betty but (for whatever inexcusable reason) later breaks that promise then, all things being 
equal, we would normally say that the principle that required her to keep her promise was 
action-guiding because Amy could have used it to guide her actions (she simply chose not to 
and is blameworthy for this decision and its consequences).  
Given that justice is a moral concept it would not be surprising to find the same point 
holds true for principles of justice. And in some simple cases, where a principle of justice 
applies to an agent, it clearly does. For example, if a principle of collective responsibility 
requires Amy to vote in an upcoming election, her refusal to vote would (all things being 
equal) mean that she is guilty of not complying with that principle. If that were the case then 
it seems clear that the principle remains action-guiding because there is nothing to prevent 
Amy from using it as a decision-making procedure.  
This implies that, as with promise keeping, if an agent decides not to comply with a 
principle of justice that applies to her then it does not follow that the principle in question is 
not action-guiding. Instead it means that the principle is action-guiding for that agent and the 
agent is blameworthy for refusing to comply with the principle. The underlying reason for 
this should be clear: if a principle is action-guiding for an agent when she can use it as a 
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decision-making procedure then it follows that the principle remains action-guiding for that 
agent when she is unwilling to comply. This is because an agent’s unwillingness to comply 
with the principle does not affect her ability to derive a prescription from the principle or her 
ability to comply with it. In other words, the refusal to comply with a principle does not 
imply an inability to use a principle as a decision-making procedure and so does not 
constitute a reason for believing that the principle is not action-guiding.  
 
VIII. COMPLEX CASES 
It might be responded that whilst a principle is action-guiding when only a single agent is 
involved, in practice matters of justice usually involve the actions and cooperation of many 
agents and it is in these kinds of situations that non-compliance affects the duty of agents to 
use a particular principle to guide their actions. It is true that the collective nature of many 
duties of justice does complicate the circumstances under which a principle counts as action-
guiding because it makes using a principle as a decision-making procedure more complex. 
However, we should not move too quickly and assume that just because some agents have 
refused to comply with a principle that this will invariably affect the duty that others have to 
comply. In many situations the non-compliance of some agents has little or no effect on any 
agent’s ability and duty to use a principle to guide their actions even when that principle 
applies collectively. 
 For example, if a principle of justice requires each citizen to vote for a particular 
political party because its policies best support just institutions it does not matter that some 
fail to vote (or vote for another party) if enough people vote for the correct party and so it 
gains power and can implement its policies. The fact that some agents refuse to comply with 
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the principle does not prevent Amy, or any other agent, from using that principle as a 
decision-making procedure and so it remains action-guiding for all agents.32 
 In this example the salient point is that non-compliance has no significant impact on 
the ability or duty of agents to use a principle as a decision-making procedure. This means 
that from the point of view of the action-guiding role of a principle nothing changes. Those 
agents who are willing to comply with a principle can do so in the same way they would in 
circumstances of full-compliance and those who refuse to comply can still use the principle to 
guide their actions, they simply choose not to. In cases such as these, non-compliance does 
not affect any agent’s ability to use a principle as a guide and so does not affect the action-
guiding role of a principle.  
In some scenarios, however, non-compliance does have significant consequences. If 
large enough numbers of citizens decide not to vote then non-compliance becomes a serious 
problem and there are likely to be implications for those agents who are willing to comply 
with a principle. This could be because either the system of democratic voting and collective 
responsibility is rendered impotent in the face of mass abstention or because the party that 
would best further justice will not be voted into power. Another, more general way of putting 
this would be to say that for an action prescribed by a principle there is often a threshold of 
                                                          
32 This is the gist of the point that Cohen makes against Andrew Williams when he points out 
that complying with a principle need not depend on others also complying. However Cohen 
fails to adequately appreciate that at times the duty to comply with a principle does depend on 
other agents being willing to comply (see below). See Cohen, G. A. (2008, 348-354) and 
Williams (1998).  
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non-compliance which when passed has consequences that threaten the possibility of 
achieving a just outcome and calls into question the guidance that a principle offers.33  
From the point of view of an agent’s duty to use a principle, the non-compliance 
threshold is of vital importance because it marks the point at which the refusal of some to 
comply with a principle alters the conditions under which other agents act.  What we need to 
establish is whether or not the effect of passing the non-compliance threshold is such that 
agents who would have been expected to use a principle to guide their actions under full-
compliance no longer have a duty to do so in circumstances of non-compliance.  
 
IX. THRESHOLD EFFECTED CASES 
When sufficient numbers of agents refuse to comply with a principle and the non-compliance 
threshold is passed the guidance offered by a principle can be affected. This is because non-
compliance changes the circumstances in which a principle is applied and this affects how 
those willing to comply stand in relation to that principle. In circumstances of full-
compliance all agents apply a principle under the assumption that others are willing to 
comply. When some refuse to comply with a principle the facts of the situation change and 
this means that when willing compliers apply a principle they do so on the basis of a different 
set of non-moral beliefs. This is important because whether and how an agent uses a principle 
as a guide depends upon the facts of their situation. This would suggest that what agents are 
                                                          
33 On the idea of a threshold effect see Lyons (1965, 72-3). 
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expected do in circumstances of non-compliance will be affected by the non-compliance of 
others.34  
To see how non-compliance affects the action-guiding role of a principle it will be 
helpful to divide the agents to which a principle applies into those who are willing to comply 
with a principle (willing compliers) and those who are unwilling to comply (non-compliers). 
If non-compliance does render a principle incapable of guiding action then it must be that 
when some agents refuse to comply no agent can or should comply with that principle. We 
will see that this is not the case because when some refuse to comply with a principle it 
always remains action-guiding for non-compliers and in most situations remains action-
guiding for willing compliers.  
When the non-compliance threshold is passed for a prescribed action there are three 
possible ways in which non-compliance can affect willing compliers: firstly, willing 
compliers can be asked to pick up the slack left by non-compliers; secondly, willing 
compliers may be expected to continue to do their fair-share as defined under full-
compliance; and thirdly, willing compliers may have their duty to comply cancelled either 
because compliance is not possible or is no longer required.35 I am going to run through each 
                                                          
34 As Tamar Schapiro puts it: changes in circumstance can ‘corrupt [actions] by detaching 
them from the constitutive background against which they acquire their animating spirit’. 
Schapiro (2006, 48).  My thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this 
point.  
35 David Miller suggests willing compliers might be entitled to ‘grouch’, that is, to only 
comply partially with a principle, when others refuse to do their part. I exclude discussion of 
this on the grounds that grouching is unlikely to be a reasonable response to non-compliance 
because it would implicate willing compliers in the harm that non-compliances inflicts on 
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of these possibilities in turn and consider how non-compliance affects the action-guiding role 
of a principle. In so doing I simplify things by making the following three assumptions: 
firstly, I assume that a set of identifiable agents have a collective duty of justice to bring 
about some outcome by performing some action, or series of actions, and that each individual 
agent knows which individual action(s) they have a duty to perform. Secondly, I assume that 
those who refuse to comply cannot be forced to comply. Naturally, where appropriate 
mechanisms exist and it is possible to enforce compliance then this is the proper response, but 
I am concerned here with the affect that non-compliance has on the guiding role of justice 
and not on how non-compliance can be prevented. Thirdly, I assume that those who refuse to 
comply could comply if they wanted to. In practice this might not always be possible as 
sometimes the moment passes and the damage is done and when that happens moral blame 
takes the place of the duty to comply. But for present purposes I will assume that those who 
are unwilling to comply could comply if they wanted to.36 I will begin by looking at cases 
where agents who are willing to comply are expected to pick up the slack left by non-
compliers.  
 
a) Slack-Picking  
When the non-compliance threshold is passed the action prescribed by a principle is either 
not performed or only partially performed, which means that those who are owed justice will 
receive less than they are due. One possible response in this situation is to ask willing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
those who are owed justice. There are situations in which willing compliers cannot comply or 
ought not to comply, but I consider these under duty-cancelling cases. See Miller (2013, 216-
7). 
36 On each of these three points see Miller (2013, 208-10 and 215-16). 
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compliers to pick up the slack left by non-compliers in order to prevent the harm that would 
otherwise befall those who are owed justice. For example, assume a principle of sufficiency 
requires citizens to pay taxes at a particular level in order to fund welfare services that ensure 
than no citizen has less than sufficient (however that is defined). Assume also that the refusal 
of some to pay their fair share (by utilising tax evasion or avoidance strategies) means that 
the poorest citizens will have less than sufficient and so there is a case for asking the 
wealthiest of the willing compliers to pick up the slack by contributing more than their fair 
share as was determined under full-compliance.  
 If the principle of sufficiency is action-guiding when all are willing to comply is there 
any reason to think that it is not action-guiding when some refuse to comply and others are 
required to pick up the slack? To see that there is not consider the guidance that the principle 
provides for each set of agents. For non-compliers the principle continues to be action-
guiding in exactly the way it would be under full-compliance because in each instance the 
principle could be used by non-compliers as a decision-making procedure and would provide 
exactly the same guidance each time, viz. contribute your fair share. For willing compliers 
things are little more complicated. Whereas under full-compliance each willing complier is 
expected to pay their fair share in taxation, in circumstances of non-compliance they are told 
to pay their fair share as originally determined and, additionally, their fair share of the slack 
that is to be picked up. This does not, however, mean that the principle of sufficiency is no 
longer action-guiding because it still applies to the willing compliers and can be used by them 
as a guide. What alters is the prescription issued by the principle to the willing compliers. It 
changes because the facts of the case have altered from a situation in which all agents will 
comply to one in which only some agents will comply. When the context in which a principle 
applies changes, as is the case when some agents refuse to comply, then the prescription also 
changes to take into account the revised facts of the situation. In this example the refusal of 
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some to comply means that the total amount that must be paid as tax is divided across a 
smaller number of citizens (the willing compliers) with the consequence that each, or at least 
some, of the willing compliers must pay more to ensure that no citizen has less than 
sufficient.  
The important point for us is that the principle continues to apply to and provide 
guidance for willing compliers because it can be used by them as a decision-making 
procedure. This means that in cases of non-compliance where some agents are required to 
pick up the slack left by others, a principle of justice remains action-guiding for both non-
compliers and willing compliers. It tells the former to comply and do their fair share and the 
latter to do their fair-share and pick up their fair share of the slack left by those who refuse to 
comply.  
 
b) Fair Shares  
In a second set of cases in which the non-compliance threshold has been passed, willing 
compliers may not have a duty to pick up the slack left by non-compliers but will still be 
expected to do their fair share as this was determined under full-compliance. In these 
situations principles remain action-guiding for both willing compliers and non-compliers in 
exactly the same way as they are in circumstances of full-compliance.  
 To see this we can again imagine that a sufficiency principle requires all citizens to 
pay their fair share in tax to fund welfare services and the refusal of some to pay their fair 
share means that the poorest citizens will have less than sufficient. This time, though, willing 
compliers are (for whatever reason) not required to pick up the slack, but are expected to 
continue to pay their fair share of tax as that was defined under full-compliance. In the slack 
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picking case the willing compliers who picked up the slack had to bear the burden of the 
injustice caused by the refusal of some to comply. This time it is those who are owed justice 
(who now have less than sufficient) who bear the consequences of non-compliance because 
they do not receive all that they are due.  
 In this situation the principle of sufficiency remains action-guiding for both willing 
compliers and non-compliers in exactly the same way as it would be in circumstances of full-
compliance. Willing compliers can still use the principle as a decision-making procedure and 
will derive the same prescription as they would under full-compliance because they are 
required to pay their fair share regardless of whether or not all comply. The duties of non-
compliers also remain exactly the same as they too could consult the same principle and 
derive the same prescription as they would under full-compliance (i.e. ‘pay your fair-share’).  
Consequently, in cases such as this non-compliance has no effect on the action-guiding 
capabilities of a principle because it remains action-guiding for all agents in exactly the same 
way it would be in circumstances of full-compliance.  
  
c) Duty Cancelling 
A third set of cases concerns those situations in which the refusal of some agents to comply 
with a principle means that willing compliers either cannot comply or no longer have a duty 
to comply. In situations of this type the effect of non-compliance is such that a principle is no 
longer action-guiding for willing-compliers, but it remains action-guiding for non-compliers. 
We can briefly consider two examples to illustrate this.  
Firstly, imagine that it takes six lifeguards to launch and operate a life-boat and 
successfully execute a sea-rescue. If there are only six lifeguards on duty at any one time then 
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it follows that the compliance of all the lifeguards is required if the passengers on a stranded 
boat are to be rescued. Assuming that the lifeguards on duty have a collective duty to rescue 
the passengers on a stranded boat, the refusal of two lifeguards to do their part means that the 
remaining four lifeguards will be unable to launch and operate the boat and so will be unable 
to rescue the passengers on board the ailing boat. As the willing compliers are unable to 
comply with the rescue principle then it is not action-guiding for them (because ‘ought 
implies can’). Secondly, imagine the same scenario but assume this time that the refusal of 
two of the lifeguards to do their part does not mean that the other four guards cannot launch 
the life boat, but it does mean that attempting a rescue would be so hazardous as to represent 
an imminent risk to the lives of the four complying lifeguards. In this scenario the duty to 
rescue the passengers of the stranded boat is cancelled because the four lifeguards do not 
have a duty to undertake a rescue when doing so constitutes a substantial risk to their lives.37  
 In both of these examples the action-guiding role of justice is compromised.38 This is 
because if the non-compliance of some means that willing compliers are unable to comply or 
no longer have a duty to comply then the principle is not action-guiding for those agents. The 
same is not true for non-compliers. If non-compliers were motivated to comply with the 
principle then they could because the fact that they can count on the willing compliers to 
comply means that there is no obstacle (other than their own unwillingness) to prevent them 
                                                          
37  On this point again see Goodin (2009). 
38 This discussion of duty-cancelling cases is consistent with Tamar Schapiro’s insightful 
discussion of Kantian rigorism and mitigating circumstances. See Schapiro (2006, 49-56). 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to this article. See also Schapiro 
(2003).  
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from using the principle to guide their actions. The principle therefore remains action-guiding 
for non-compliers in both of these examples.  
Although in these situations a principle is no longer action-guiding for willing compliers 
it does not mean that they will have no duties because secondary duties may come into play 
at this point. For example, if it is not possible to rescue an agent in circumstances of non-
compliance there may be a secondary duty to work to bring about the circumstances that 
would prevent agents from being denied justice in similar circumstances in the future. And 
whilst there is not the space to make the argument here, it seems likely that something like 
Rawls’s view of the action-guiding role of justice applies in situations such as this because 
knowing which secondary duties apply to willing compliers depends on being able to identify 
the outcome that a principle was supposed to bring about.39 If that is correct then it would 
mean, contrary to Sen,40 that not only is a principle action-guiding for non-compliers under 
these circumstances, but knowledge of the principle is necessary for determining which (if 
any) secondary duties apply to willing compliers. 
 
X. IS DUTY CANCELLING THE NORM? 
                                                          
39 My suggestion is that in duty cancelling cases a secondary (or ‘non-ideal)’ principle is 
identified by its ability to either: i) bring about an outcome that is as close as possible to a just 
outcome or ii) contribute to the transition to a state of affairs in which a just outcome would 
be possible. In both cases identifying the appropriate actions necessarily depends on 
knowledge of what a just outcome would be, which in turn requires knowledge of the 
relevant principle of justice. On Rawls and ‘non-ideal’ duties see Simmons (2010) and 
Chahboun (2015). 
40 See Sen (2006). For criticisms of Sen that are consistent with this view see Boot (2012). 
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Although a principle always remains action-guiding for non-compliers in duty-cancelling 
cases, the fact that it is not action-guiding for willing compliers means that there is one 
situation in which justice is not action-guiding in circumstances of non-compliance for one 
set of agents. If it turned out that such cases were the norm in politics then this would 
constitute a partial vindication of the realist claim that justice is not action-guiding in 
circumstances of non-compliance. In the remainder of this section I want to explain why 
duty-cancelling cases are not typical in moderately just and nearly just societies.41  
We have seen that even though problems of non-compliance with justice are usually 
collective action problems, it does not follow that when some refuse to comply with a 
principle that no-one can comply or that duties of justice cannot be discharged (either fully or 
partially). In two of the four cases discussed above (non-threshold cases and slack-picking 
cases) we saw that willing compliers can still comply with justice because non-compliance 
either does not prevent collective duties from being discharged or else because willing 
compliers pick up the slack left by non-compliers. In a third case we saw that whilst non-
compliance meant that collective duties were not fully discharged, a principle remained 
action-guiding for willing compliers because they could still do their fair-share as defined 
under circumstances of full-compliance.  
This does not, of course, demonstrate that duty-cancelling cases are not the norm in 
politics, only that they are not the necessary consequence of non-compliance. So, in order to 
see that such cases are not typical consider the features that would have to be present if all or 
most cases of non-compliance with justice were duty-cancelling. Firstly, all citizens who are 
willing to comply with justice must be rendered either incapable of complying with a 
principle of justice or else the consequences of complying when others do not must be such 
                                                          
41  My thanks to an anonymous referee who pressed me to develop this argument further.  
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that no willing complier can reasonably be expected to comply. And secondly, given that in 
duty-cancelling cases no agent complies with a principle, it follows that whatever outcome a 
principle requires is not realised (even in part). What we need to establish is whether or not 
this is an accurate depiction of the experiences of moderately just and nearly just societies.    
 In radically unjust societies it seems clear that non-compliance will be duty-
cancelling because those citizens who are willing to comply with justice frequently have 
either little opportunity to do so or would be under no obligation to do so (because trying to 
comply alone would be futile, unfairly burdensome or dangerous). However, the same is not 
true of moderately just or nearly just democratic societies. In such societies, and particularly 
nearly just societies, citizens can often discharge their duties of justice. We have already seen 
in the examples given earlier that citizens can usually comply with the duty to support and 
further just institutions even when others do not. Thus, the duty to vote and support the 
political party that a citizen justifiably believes will best further justice is not normally 
dependent on all other citizens doing the same. Similarly, duties to comply with just laws, 
pay taxation, respect the rights and property of other citizens do not depend on full-
compliance because those who wish to comply with just laws, pay the tax they owe and 
respect the rights and property of others can do so even when others do not.  
If we turn to the second feature we would expect to see if duty-cancelling cases were 
the norm, then we again see that this does not tally with the experiences of moderately and 
nearly just societies. For a case of non-compliance to be duty-cancelling it must be that 
willing compliers cannot or should not comply with a principle. When that happens no agent 
complies with justice, meaning that there is a complete and total collective failure to do 
whatever it is some principle of justice prescribes. This describes the experience of radically 
unjust societies, but it is not normally what happens in moderately just and nearly just 
societies. Social and political institutions in moderately just or nearly just societies are not 
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perfectly just, but equally they are not perfectly unjust. Instead, they are partially just (or 
unjust) with failings arising from non-compliance with principles of justice varying in kind, 
degree and intensity. The only reason that plausibly explains why institutions are moderately 
or nearly just, rather than perfectly unjust, is that compliance with principles of justice is (to a 
greater or lesser degree) partial. And if that is true then it means that duty-cancelling cases 
cannot be the norm because they are, by definition, cases in which compliance is zero. 
It is not plausible, then, to claim that duty-cancelling cases are the norm in politics  
because neither of the features that characterise such cases are normally present in 
moderately just and nearly just societies. This suggests that in most cases, those who are 
willing to comply with a given principle of justice can discharge their duties, even when 
others do not, and that justice is therefore normally action-guiding for willing compliers as 
well as non-compliers.   
 
XI. IMPLICATIONS 
The account of action-guidance presented in this paper has important implications for how 
we think about justice and politics, two of which are worth briefly drawing attention to.  
Firstly, and most obviously, it implies that we ought to reject realist accounts of politics and 
justice. Whereas realists emphasise the primacy of coercion, compromise and expediency in 
politics, the argument of this paper implies that decision-making in politics ought to be 
constrained and informed by justice. According to this view, when citizens vote for political 
parties or campaign for particular interests they should do so on the basis of a defensible 
conception of justice. And when political representatives and leaders propose, oppose and 
enact legislation they again should do so on the basis of moral reasons that are rooted in a 
defensible conception of justice. An underlying assumption of this paper, then, is that 
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decision-making and action in politics could and should be informed by justice and that the 
unwillingness to be guided by justice is wrong because it sacrifices what citizens ought to do 
to what they are willing to do. The argument of this paper therefore aligns with those who 
worry that realist politics are ‘concessive’ and believe that political decision-making ought to 
be constrained and informed by a defensible conception of justice.42  
Secondly, the account of the action-guiding role of justice presented in this paper 
suggests that there are morally right (and wrong) answers to the question ‘what should we 
do?’ This should not be interpreted as meaning that there is only ever a single, correct answer 
to a political problem. But this paper does assume that for any given issue there will be 
morally permissible and impermissible actions available and that citizens can and should use 
a defensible conception of justice to help them identify those actions that are consistent with 
justice. This view of the guiding role of justice may appear to sit uncomfortably with the 
emphasis that is placed on pluralism and disagreement in much of the political theory 
literature today. It might also be thought to be at odds with the widely held view that because 
citizens (reasonably) disagree about justice some other (democratic) method for making 
political decisions must be found.  
This paper does not deny that disagreement (reasonable or otherwise) extends to 
almost every issue and facet of political life.  And nor does it reject the need for democratic 
decision-making procedures to overcome disagreement between citizens. However, it does 
reject the claim that justice cannot provide guidance to citizens when they disagree about 
what to do. The fact that we disagree about the right response to some issue does not imply 
                                                          
42 This would include the writings of the earlier Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and G. A. Cohen. 
See Rawls (1999a); Dworkin (2011); Cohen (2008). On the charge that realism is concessive 
with respect to justice see Stemplowska (2008); Swift (2008); Estlund (2011).   
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that there is no longer a morally right response or that seeking to identify that response is 
somehow pointless or foolish. I assume the opposite is true. When citizens disagree about 
justice I believe that this is a reason for each person to reflect more carefully on what justice 
requires of them and to ensure that whatever actions they support and argue for are guided by 
a defensible conception of justice. And even though collective decisions are made 
democratically in the face of disagreements between citizens, how citizens decide and what 
they decide should still be guided by a defensible conception of justice.  
Consequently, the account of action-guidance I outlined above assumes that moral 
reasoning is at the heart of politics and expects citizens and political leaders, both 
individually and collectively, to make decisions on the basis of what a theory of justice 
permits and prohibits. This account of action-guidance therefore rejects not only political 
realism, but also the procedural politics associated with agonist and radical democracy,43 
majoritarianism,44 and some recent, more realistic accounts of public justification.45 
 
XII. CONCLUSION 
This paper makes three contributions to our understanding of the action-guiding role of a 
theory of justice. Firstly, it explains that a theory of justice is action-guiding because its 
principles function as decision-making procedures that citizens can use to help them decide 
what to do in matters relating to the design of their shared institutions. Secondly, it sets out 
the criteria that must be satisfied for a particular theory to count as action-guiding. These 
                                                          
43 Connolly (1991); Mouffe (2000) 
44 Sleat (2013); Waldron (1999)  
45 Gaus (2011) 
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criteria state that a theory is action-guiding for citizens when i) its principles are capable of 
delivering coherent, consistent and determinate verdicts on the justness or unjustness of 
actions across a range of cases and ii) citizens have (or can reasonably be expected to 
acquire) the beliefs and abilities needed to derive a prescription from a principle and comply 
with it. Thirdly, this paper demonstrates that principles of justice are action-guiding in 
circumstances of non-compliance by showing that the refusal of some citizens to do as they 
ought does not usually prevent any citizen from using a principle as a decision-making 
procedure. I did note one set of exceptions to that claim (duty-cancelling cases), but pointed 
out that even in such cases principles of justice remain action-guiding for non-compliers. I 
also suggested, though did not argue, that in duty cancelling cases knowledge of principles of 
justice may be necessary for identifying further, secondary duties in the way that Rawls 
describes.  
 The account given in this paper improves on Rawls’s brief discussion of the action-
guiding role of justice because it specifies the criteria that must be satisfied for a theory to 
qualify as action-guiding. It also explains more persuasively than Rawls how a theory of 
justice is often directly and immediately action-guiding for citizens in circumstances of non-
compliance. In so doing it demonstrates that those who argue that justice is not action-
guiding in circumstances of non-compliance are mistaken. It is important to recognise this 
because the failure to acknowledge that justice is action-guiding in circumstances of non-
compliance not only constitutes a basic misunderstanding of how justice applies to citizens in 
unjust circumstances. It also threatens to give licence to those who are unwilling to comply 
with justice by excusing their behaviour on the erroneous grounds that acting justly is either 
not possible or not required. If nothing else it is hoped that this paper has demonstrated that 
arguments that deny justice an action-guiding role in circumstances of non-compliance are 
untenable.  
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